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Book Reviews 
Dryden in Revolutionary England by David Bywaters. Berkeley, Los Angeles, 
and Oxford: University of California Press, 1991. Pp. xiii + 196; $25.00. 
Although he has "no quarrel ... with deconstruction, postfreudianisID, or 
neomarxisffi," David Bywaters believes that "the exclusive application of 
these and similar theories to past literature has the unfortunate effect of 
drawing us into a kind of historical solipsism that allows us to see nothing in 
the past but our own reflection" (x). In a forthright preface, Bywaters explains 
his own "methodology," one "hardly new to Dryden studies": he wishes "to 
situate [Dryden's later] works in political and literatry contexls with which 
Dryden and his readers would have been demonstrably familiar" (ix). Having 
devoted years to similar projects, I can hardly criticize this goal, and I am in 
general agreement with the picture of the late Dryden that emerges from this 
crisply argued and smoothly written study. Unfortunately, an interpretation 
alert to the veiled political references in the poet's later works is no longer a 
revisionist innovation, though it may have seemed to be when Bywaters was 
doing his graduate work under Steven Zwicker; and in choosing to empha-
size politics, Bywaters sometimes loses sight of other important aspects of the 
works he analyzes. 
In the Introduction, for example, Bywaters correctly identifies Dryden's 
tendency "to rate the governments of all ages (including his own) by their 
sponsorship of the arts" (7). He might have remembered that principle before 
referring to the poet's "patriotic hatred of the French" (3). In fact, Dryden 
praised Louis XIV in the Discourse on the Original and Progress of Satire (1693) 
as "the Patron of all Arts," extolling "the Bounty of that King to Men of 
Learning and Merit: A Praise so just, that even we who are his Enemies, can-
not refuse it him." The qualifying disclaimer did not convince Dryden's ene-
mies, who contrasted this praise with the old poet's silence on the death of 
Queen Mary; undaunted, Dryden stubbornly repeated his praise of the 
"Magnificence and encouragement of the present King of France" in "A Paral-
lel of Poetry and Painting" (1695). As this small example suggests, Dryden is 
slippery: his occasional participation in the satirical sneering at the French so 
typical of English writers did not prevent him from noticing Louis's accom-
plishments as a patron of the arts; his need to express his continuing Jacobite 
and Roman Catholic sentiments by irony and innuendo in his later works did 
not prevent him from attending to literary and aesthetic concerns in those 
same works. 
In a generally sensible chapter on The Hind and the Panther, Bywaters be-
gins by declaring that "most readers of the poem from the time of its first 
publication to the present have recognized [that] the concerns of The Hind 
and the Panther are mainly political." Seventeenth-century religion and poli-
tics were indeed deeply entangled, but that fact does not justify collapsing 
the distinction between religion and politics, as Bywaters does by implying 
that Dryden, who wrote this poem to defend the most serious personal deci-
sion of his life, was unconcerned with theology: "Transubstantiation had 
been an object of derision to English Protestants of all kinds long before the 
Test Act, but this hardly matters to Dryden. He is primarily interested not in 
the doctrine itself, but in its political consequences, and this is no less true of 
all the points of dogma under discussion in part II" (16). Yet Dryden's per-
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sonal journey with respect to the doctrine of transubstantiation was in fact a 
serious and painful one. In Absalom and Achitophel (1681), he treated the 
Catholic view as Han object of derision': 
Th' Egyptian Rites the Jebusites imbrac'd; 
Where Gods were recommended by their Tast. 
Such savory Deities must needs be good, 
As serv'd at once for Worship and for Food. 
In The Hind and the Panther (1687), however, he dramatized his struggle to 
accept a doctrine contrary to the evidence of sense-impressions: 
Can I my reason to my faith compell 
And shall my sight, and touch, and taste rebell? 
Superiour faculties are set aside, 
Shall their subservient organs be my guide? 
Then let the moon usurp the rule of day, 
And winking tapers shew the sun his way; 
For what my senses can themselves perceive 
I need no revelation to believe. 
If he remained an acutely political writer (as such words as HSuperiour: 
'subservient,' and especially 'usurp" suggest), Dryden was also a man of 
faith. Properly understood, his religiOUS conversion reveals him as a poet 
continuaUy engaged with the largest questions of meaning and value. Bywa-
ters recognizes a part of that truth when he argues that The Hind and the 
Panther claims 'a different kind of authority drawn from the poet's professed 
mastery of and participation in a venerable and transcendent literary 
tradition" (10-11). Though clear and weU-informed, his chapter is too short 
to be a major contribution to our understanding of Dryden's longest and 
most complex original poem, which still awaits a fuJI-scale reading. 
The material on Don Sebastian in chapter two was published in JEGP in 
1986; the idea that the play makes explicit reference to politics was first 
argued by john Robert Moore in 1958. Here especially, we encounter little 
that is new. In a paraUel treatment of Amphitryon, Bywaters extends the argu-
ment first offered in james Garrison's influential article of 1980, which con-
structs a political allegory in which Alcmena is England, Amphitron james, 
and jupiter WiJliam. judith Milhous and Robert Hume have pOinted to some 
problems with this sweeping reading in Producible Interpretation (1985); their 
chaper goes uncited here. Although Bywaters is usually cautious about push-
ing his political readings too far, his treatment of Amphitryon does show 
some strain. Accepting a bribe from the disguised jupiter, who wishes to gain 
access to Alcmena's bed, the servant Phaedra asks whether he would Hhave 
[his] Mony out of the Treasury, without paying the Officers their Fees." Ac-
cording to Bywaters, HPhaedra bargainS with jupiter as the English nation, 
which she explicitly represents, bargains with WiJliam: he may raid the treas-
ury only after he has bribed its officers' (68). But the context of Phaedra's 
remarks does not suggest such a large-scale aUegory. jupiter has complained 
that "Her Sex is Avarice, and she, in One, / Is all her Sex/' a conventional 
piece of ugly misogyny; Phaedra wishes to remind him that male officers in 
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the treasury engage in similar avarice. Moreover, Dryden knew to his cost 
the difficulty of collecting a legitimate salary from the treasury; Charles II 
died owing his Laureate more than £1200. Phaedra thinks that jupiter is 
Amphitryon, claiming his lawful conjugal rights as a government employee 
might claim his lawful salary; she exacts her bribe in the spirit of "business as 
usual." jupiter's entry could be construed as a "raid [on] the treasury" only if 
Phaedra knew his true identity; Bywaters can claim that she "explicitly 
represents" England only if we are willing to forget that his reading generally 
identifies Alcmena with England. The play sparkles with local political hu-
mor and innuendo, but it will not yield to a schematic allegorical interpreta-
tion. 
In his next chapter, pairing King Arthur and Cleomenes, Bywaters provides 
an excellent account of Dryden's reasons for choosing Halifax as the dedica-
tee of his refurbished opera. Again, however, some of his thunder has been 
stolen. Anne Barbeau Gardiner, in an article correcting several errors and 
omissions in my biography, makes similar points (see "Dryden's Patrons," in 
The Age of William III & Mary II: Power, Politics, and Patronage 1688-1702, ed. 
Robert Maccubbin and Martha Hamilton-Phillips [Williamsburg: College of 
William and Mary, 1989], 326-32). As Bywaters delicately notes, his reading 
of King Arthur generally "coincides" with my own shorter treatment of the 
work in John Dryden and his World (1987), but it is bound to seem less urgent 
for that very reason. Unlike Gardiner and Douglas Canfield, who see the 
playas another jacobite allegory, Bywaters believes that Cleomenes is an at-
tempt "to show how respect and admiration for James may be reconciled 
with obedience to William and patriotic devotion to English interests and 
institutions" (94). This view, for which he mounts a plausible argument, 
might seem more interesting had it not been adumbrated by judith Sloman 
in Dryden: The Poetics of Translation (1985). 
In his final chapter, which draws evidence from a variety of works in po-
etry and prose, Bywaters begins by flogging a very dead horse. The view he 
proposes to correct, which would naively accept Dryden's claims to retire-
ment and disengagement, is now held by no serious scholar; the phrases By-
waters quotes in characterizing that view come from works published in 
1962,1963, and 1967. Thomas Fujimura's last series of articles (1973-1984), 
my biography, and Cedric Reverand's work on the Fables (1988) cover much 
of the ground traversed in this chapter, but Bywaters engages only Fuji-
mura's argument, which he praises as "quite accurate" (112); he ignores the 
fact that Reverand and I have quoted and analyzed virtually every passage 
he cites in the later works. Again, the belatedness of publication robs this 
chapter of its urgency, especially since the most original argument here is a 
"periodizing" claim, an assertion that Cleomenes marks a turning point in 
Dryden's political rhetoric: "In the works written between 1687 and 1692, the 
traditional functions as a norm against which the contemporary is to be mea-
sured: the supposed crimes of William and his party are exposed through 
romance, fable, farce, or tragedy as deplorable aberrations in the common 
pursuit of truth and justice. In the later works these crimes, though no less 
deplorable, come to seem inevitable and therefore less urgently in need of 
correction" (106). The distinction seems fuzzy at best, and Dryden's career re-
sists division into neat periods. His last elegy, "Eleonora" (1692) borrows 
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phrases and images from his first, "Upon the Death of the Lord Hastings" 
(1649). His last play, Love Triumphant (1694), which Bywaters sees as 
"perhaps the clearest indication of a change in Dryden's rhetorical concerns" 
(110) is a deliberately old-fashioned tragicomedy in the mode of Secret Love 
(1667), and even includes a scene in rhymed couplets. Several of the political 
passages that Bywaters quotes when discussing the Aeneis (1697) seem to me 
to "expose the supposed crimes of William. . as deplorable aberrations," 
most obviously the punishment in Tartams of those who "Expel their par-
ents, and usurp the Throne," And despite Bywaters's correct perception that 
"the magisterial expertise of a mind enriched by years of literary study" is "an 
important part of Dryden's rhetorical strategy" (118), his own literary criti-
cism in this final chapter is oddly proportioned. Original poems, including 
the great verse epistles to Congreve and Kneller and the transcendent ode for 
music, If Alexander's Feast," are tossed away in less than three pages; ex-
tended prose treatises of great interest, the Discourse of the Original and Prog-
ress of Satire (1693) and the Dedication of the Aeneis (1697), are described as 
"baffling and disappointing," but discussed at considerable length. The tiny 
Epilogue, quoting attacks on Dryden by George Powell, Luke Milburn, and 
Jonathan Swift, serves to remind us that this study has paid very little atten-
tion to contemporary responses to Dryden, positive or negative. 
The fundamental problem with this book becomes apparent when Bywa-
ters describes Sloman's book of 1985 as "a work published since I wrote my 
own account" (186). He uses the same phrase to describe my biography 
(184), but fails to recognize that many of his points have lost their force by 
being so long delayed in publication. The blame for this delay need not be 
assigned wholly to the author: young scholars face formidable obstacles in 
getting first books accepted and printed, and university presses, despite the 
wonderful technological advances offered by the computer, remain unneces-
sarily slow and wasteful in the way they process manuscripts. I regard Bywa-
ters as a very promising younger scholar: well-trained, tough-minded, and 
articulate. If circumstances had allowed the publication of this work within a 
year of its submission as a dissertation, scholars might properly have hailed it 
as an important and original contribution. Still, accepting Bywaters' claim to 
have written his account of Cleomenes before the publication of Sloman's 
book gives us a date of 1984 for his compositon of those ages; whatever the 
reasons, a seven-year delay betwen composition and publication requires an 
author to make revisions and adjustments in light of subsequent scholarship. 
University of Michigan James A. Winn 
Byron, the Bible, and Religion: Essays from the Twelfth International Byron Semi-
nar, edited by Wolf Z. Hirst. Newark: University of Delaware Press; London 
and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1991. Pp. 196. $28.50. 
It seems reasonable that attitudes from the past must become progressively 
less intelligible. Literary works based on these dated attitudes consequently 
become more and more obscure, so that a poem which once touched many 
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people's emotions now cannot be understood, or a joke which once made the 
world laugh now draws a chuckle from a single scholar in some research li-
brary. He cannot tell it to anyone else; it would take too much explanation. 
And yet, every new attitude which has, in the course of time, become self-
evident, must have started at some point as a rare, peculiar opinion. So, para-
doxically, ideas and texts which were difficult to interpret in their own day 
begin to make sense. 
Byron's attitude towards traditional religion is an example: it was so out-
of-joint in his own day that apparently almost all his contemporaries got it 
wrong. For more than a century and a half after his death, the majority of 
commentators continued to see him as a thoroughgoing denier, who pro-
duced anti-theological tracts to scoff at the religion he rejected. Too much of 
a skeptic to defend any beliefs, he only knew what he disbelieved. Pious crit-
ics in his own day condemned Byron for these heretical attitudes; progressive 
critics in a later age praised him. Nearly all agreed about what Byron stood 
for. There seemed to he convincing evidence for this view: Byron portrays 
himself in the gloomy, scoffing heroes of his longer poems. His biblical 
drama, Cain, features as a leading character the blasphemous Lucifer. His 
Don Juan is completely irreverent. These writings are seen as of a piece with 
his private life, which was a continuing public scandal. For more than a cen-
tury and a half, this reading seemed convincing. 
In recent years, however, all the evidence of Byron's religious antipathy 
has come under attack, most tellingly by contributors to Byron, the Bible, and 
Religion. Peter Thorslev, Jr., in his The Byronic Hero,1 examines Byron's 
doomed champions as literary figures, thus beginning to· disentangle the au-
thor from his fictions so that it was no longer self-evident that Byron meant 
to be taken as identical with these heroes. Wolf Z. Hirst, in "Byron's Lapse 
into Orthodoxy: An Unorthodox Reading of Cain,'" carries that project into 
Byron's most explicitly religious work. Hirst distinguishes between the reli-
gious stance of the author and that of his main characters, Cain and Lucifer. 
The majority of critics, assuming that Lucifer and Cain speak for Byron in 
denouncing God, have no explanation for the third act, in which Lucifer does 
not appear and Cain utterly abandons his rebellion. Hirst demonstrates that 
the structure of the play is coherent if one assumes that the play is "not anti-
religious, that it accepts rather than reverses the Scriptural position, and that 
the hero's attacks upon God are dramatically invalidated" (152). Other recent 
critics have discovered hints of Byron's religious belief in Don Juan, or at 
least, of "his repeated subversions of skepticism" (Hirst, Introduction, 15); 
similarly, in the present volume, Gordon K. Thomas argues that each of the 
central characters in Don Juan accepts the doctrine of sin and supernatural 
punishment. Contributing to the shift in the view of Byron is that few mod-
ern critics assume that religious longings are always connected with sexual 
probity. 
Thus, by 1985, when the Twelfth International Byron Seminar was held, 
leading scholars had a new understanding of Byron's religious views. In By-
ron, the Bible, and Religion, which preserves eight essays from that seminar, 
Hirst notes that " . .. there is not a single essay that depicts Byron as impious, 
let alone blasphemous; on the contrary, although no one denies the poet's 
skepticism and non-conformity, these articles seem to suggest or at least im-
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ply that some religious sentiment pervades his work" (Introduction 14). The 
essays in Byron, the Bible, and Religion continue the reassessment of Byron's 
religious stance. By 1985, Byron's complex religious sensibility, featuring 
both skepticism and a yearning toward belief, consistent acceptance of some 
religious doctrines with rejection of others, hatred for smug certainty along 
with respect for simple faith, had become intelligible. It no longer looked like 
scoffing. 
Byron's complex relationship with the Bible also received attention at the 
Seminar. Byron criticism had forgotten that the poet continually read the Bi-
ble. In 1821, he wrote from Italy to ask a friend to send him a Bible; he had 
one with him, but that had been a gift from his sister and he did not want to 
wear it out. He worked biblical images and allusions into nearly all his writ-
ings, often ironically playing off the original context in a technique more fa-
miliar to readers of Hebrew poetry than of English. Hirst, in this volume (77-
79), identifies a brilliant example: In Childe Harold, Byron contemplates the 
succession of religions, which will continue through human history until man 
learns that his "hope is built on reeds" (2.3). The reed as a metaphor for un-
dependability originates in 2 Kings 18:21, where the unreliability of earthly 
monarchs is impliCitly contrasted with the faithfulness of God. Like his bibli-
cal source, Byron invokes the reed as an image of untrustworthiness; but in 
his most skeptical mood, he turns the metaphor against all religions, includ-
ing that of the Bible itself; A fuller sense of the complexity of this, as of other 
passages, depends upon recognizing the biblical source which the poet has 
ironically reversed. 
Several of the contributions to this volume achieve real excellence. Hirst's 
introduction, besides providing a summary of each of the essays and a his-
tory of critical approaches to Byron's religious thought, also constitutes a fas-
cinating meditation on lithe link between the concepts inherent in an ancient 
work [the Bible] and the ideas conveyed by its modem adaptation [in Byron's 
works]." 
Harold Fisch's contribution, "Byron's Cain as Sacred Executioner," locates 
the source of the heroic Cain of Byron's mystery in subtle hints within the 
biblical text itself. Accounting for those same hints, a modern scholar, Hyam 
Maccoby, argues that the biblical record partly preserves and partly sup-
presses a very different version, told by the people who saw themselves as 
proud descendents of Cain.3 In a sharp demonstration of Byron's skill as a 
reader, Fisch shows how closely the poet anticipates Maccoby's view of Cain. 
Ricardo J. Quinones puts Byron's Cain in the context of the history of the 
figure of Cain. The article is valuable also as a road map of Quinones's recent 
encyclopedic study of the different uses of the story in world literature, The 
Changes of Cain' 
Peter Thorslev shows Byron's debt to Pierre Bayle, the French Protestant 
thinker, whose Dictionary was an immensely popular ironic attack on misin-
formation about the Bible. Bayle is generally recognized as the likely source 
of much of Byron's knowledge of esoteric religious teachings. Thorslev dem-
onstrates that the affinity between the two writers goes much further than 
that. Like Bayle, Byron delighted in using irony to debunk cant. Bayle was 
willing to extend tolerance to all, whatever their religious beliefs, even to 
atheists if they behaved decently; Byron also championed toleration and indi-
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vidual conscience. Byron and Bayle were both fascinated by history, but both 
refused to impose a system upon it. Bayle, though a hero to skeptics such as 
Voltaire and Gibbon, protested that he was a man of faith, whose own work 
was intended only to pare away false beliefs from the true. In their own day, 
neither Bayle nor Byron could make that protest heard. 
Heaven and Earth has often been considered Byron's direct attack on the 
morality of the Bible. In his contribution, Ray Stevens demonstrates that By-
ron uses the biblical story of the Flood as a vehicle to meditate on the mys-
tery of divine justice, and to examine the Calvinist doctrine of the salvation 
of the elect. 
The volume as a whole is proof enough that some modem readers have 
reassessed Byron's religious stance. It is interesting to speculate about why 
the traditional assessment of Byron suddenly became inadequate now, when 
it had seemed adequate all these years (a question not directly asked by any 
author in Byron, the Bible, and Religion). I suspect that Byron's contemporaries 
compared his beliefs to complete, confident Christian faith: measured by that 
standard, Byron was always a doubter. Modern readers, on the other hand, 
compare his beliefs to complete, thoroughgoing secularism: measured by that 
standard, Byron was nearly always a believer. 
If that is so, it can be argued that modern readers have not made any new 
discovery or found any deeper insight into the nature of Byron; perhaps we 
detect his faith because of a change in fashion, to be replaced at some future 
date by the next fashion, according to which Byron's faith will once again be 
undetectable. Perhaps modern readers, trapped in our own age, are no closer 
to understanding Byron than were his contemporaries. But I believe that such 
thoroughgoing relativism is unwarranted. Byron himself often protested that 
he was misunderstood, that his critics refused to recognize his faith in God. 
For more than 150 years, most readers explained away many of Byron's own 
words in order to arrive at the conclusion that he meant to destroy religion. 
They typically argued that anything positive he said about religious faith 
must have been "disingenuous" and "defensive sophistry. liS The writers in By-
rOll, the Bible, alld Religioll have a more direct way of understanding much of 
what Byron himself said about his religious stance. I believe that the new 
consensus on this issue will stand the test of time. 
Wayne State University Louis Finkelman 
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Erotic Faith: Being in Love from Jane Austen to D. H. Lawrence by Robert Pol-
hemus. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. Pp. xii + 363. $29.95. 
Fictions of Modesty: Women and Courtship in the English Novel by Ruth Ber-
nard Yeazell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. Pp. xii + 306. 
$24.95. 
These two books are by respected scholars and critics concerned with the 
historical and continued moral significance of nineteenth-century English fic-
tion; both argue that language and the literary imagination inform what we 
think of as reality. Robert Polhemus's thesis is that the novel "rose," as we 
used to say I alongside a growing faith in sexual love as a mode of transcend-
ence, and that this "erotic faith" replaced an earlier, outworn creed largely on 
the strength of its counter-testament, the novel. Ruth Yeazell's focus is on the 
ordinary, not the transcendent. As she sees it, the mutually contradictory fic-
tions and facts of diurnal discourse and psycho-social life seek resolution in 
narrative: examining the tropes of philosophers and moralists, journalists and 
scientists, she shows how they framed and intensified the conflicts that nov-
els explored, and how the novels they helped to generate show them up, in 
the end, as fictions too. 
The reviewer is hard put to avoid comparing and contrasting and finally 
polarizing these studies, in spite of the well-known perils of binary thinking. 
Fictions of Modesty charts the cultural construction of female passionlessness 
(and therefore passion) from The Tatler to Havelock Ellis; Erotic Faith, subti-
tled "Being in Love from Jane Austen to D. H. Lawrence," covers more or less 
the same swath of time and space. Although Yeazell begins and ends with 
discussions of para-literary texts, the heart of her book is, like Polhemus's, a 
series of readings of English novels, chosen from what was once called The 
Great Tradition (currently known as The Canon) and chronologically organ-
ized in the service of a metanarrative. The tradition is sufficiently great to al-
low ample room for choice: Polhemus departs from the standard syllabus of 
courses in The Novel to place Scott's The Bride of Lammermoor between 
works by Austen and Emily Bronte, and Yeazell surprises with a reading of 
Cleland's Fanny Hill after her chapter on Pamela; the only novel both discuss 
is Charlotte Bronte's Villette. 
Yeazell situates "her" novels in a context of discourse, including philosoph-
ical tracts, conduct manuals and advice literature; Polhemus writes in the 
very different tradition of sister-arts criticism, introducing discussions of op-
era and ballet and especially paintings (beautiful reproductions enhance his 
text) to illuminate and reinforce what he says about novels. But my binaries 
begin to break down at this point. It will not quite do to describe Erotic Faith 
as a traditional aesthetic reading, in contrast to a newer feminist, materialist, 
Foucaultian, new-historical one. For all its attention to the human sciences, 
Fictions of Modesty is informed by a traditional (and finely honed) literary 
sensibility; Yeazell reads "for," not "against" her texts. And Polhemus, the au-
thor of an earlier reading of the nineteenth-century novel, Comic Faith, writes 
in a very personal voice and a freshened spirit of revaluation, coming back to 
old texts with a vision informed by, among other things, recent feminist criti-
cism. Not that this is a case of Reading As A Woman. On the contrary. 
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In one of the early Women's Studies courses I taught in the 1970s, there 
was a sale young man who read Pride and Prejudice-startlingly, engagingly 
-as Darcy's story. He said he liked its difference from all those books about 
men who had to leave home and struggle to make something of themselves; 
he admired the master of Pemberley, who works at nothing but human rela-
tionships and lives only for the personal, private life, as only women are sup-
posed (we were protesting this) to do. The first chapter of Erotic Faith re-
hearses a version of the argument that Jane Austen's most admired novel is 
really about Elizabeth Bennet's lover. For Polhemus, as for my student of 
long ago, the story hangs on Darcy's falling in love-not the heroine's com-
ing to know herself, and marry him. Austen's account of a haughty aristo-
crat's fall into the human condition of a lover, he argues, is the first chapter 
of the new bible-sometimes blasphemous, always fervent-that was written 
as a gloss on, and a revision and replacement of, the Book of a fading reli-
gion. For unlike my student, Polhemus believes that since Jane Austen's time 
both men and women have lived and imagined themselves to be living for 
love above all. 
Erotic faith enlists language in the service of specifically sexual pleasures, 
and values all collapses of hierarchies and boundaries (between bodies and 
"sacred" distinctions, and bodies and words), and breaking of taboos. Polhe-
mus's style is harmonious with the faith he analyzes and advocates: he en-
joys switching tones-professorial and intimate, ardent and slangy-and dar-
ing genre and gender boundaries. (He must be the first mainstream critic of 
Wuthering Heights to quote Kate Bush's song lyric.) To make his point about a 
novel, he enlists idiosyncratic, sometimes clever readings of quirkily chosen 
paintings: a Velasquez is invoked to illuminate Trollope, and Claude Lor-
rain's Judgment of Paris is described as showing the same "balance of forces" 
and "living, but menaced faith" as Hardy's Far From the Madding Crowd. An 
enthusiast of eros in all its forms, Polhemus celebrates the female body as the 
primary icon of erotic faith, but also admires the allure of a jaunty, sexy boy 
by Caravaggio; in a stunningly respectful passage, he interrrets what goes on 
in Connie Chatterley's mind, during sex, as a projection of Lawrence's re-
pressed homoerotic desire. 
His voice is very engaging. Sometimes he is a little silly ("It's a hard, en-
chanted world where love's fatality literally gives you the Wilis," he writes of 
the ballet, Giselle); sometimes his anachronisms seem gratuitously startling 
(the impression ,of the early graveyard scene works on Pip, he writes, "like 
the formatting of a floppy disk"); sometimes he is annoyingly proprietary 
in his grab at chummy intimacy {"Anyone who has ever made love 
knows. ."); and as he goes on tirelessly he does sometimes repeat himself. 
But the cumulative effect of this ardent paean to ardor is bracing. Polhemus's 
intelligence is keen and lively; he is as interesting on Klimt and Redon as he 
is on Joyce and Lawrence. The Erotics of Faith is pleasingly put together: med-
itations on the erotics of water, starring Botticelli's Venus, lead persuasively 
to a fine analysis of The Mill on the Floss; the argument that incest is a perva-
sive theme in fiction, reiterated in the chapter on Eliot's novel, reaches its cli-
max in a bold reading of the scene of the fire in Great Expectations when Pip 
"closes with" Miss Havisham. Carried by the theme of eros and language, the 
reader moves easily from The Monk through the Victorians to Joyce and Law-
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rence and even, briefly, to Beckett. Polhemus is an expansive spirit who 
dares to list the contradictory things a given passage might mean and, in a 
showy display of critical cool in his last chapter, he recalls his most outra-
geous interpretation with a sentence that begins, "Among the many things 
that the burning of Miss Havisham in Dickens's Great Expectations could be 
made to symbolize, one might be ... " (italics mine). 
This book's insistence on fiction as a source of transcendence runs counter 
to the idea-at present very well-received-that the English novel articulated 
the harsh, imprisoning ideology of individualism and capitalism. Polhemus, 
who lists Nancy Armstrong's Desire and Domestic Fiction in his bibliography, 
is too good-humored and love-struck to take issue with this theory, and flexi-
ble and subtle enough to agree with some of it. But his emphasis on a succes-
sion of brilliant heroic artists responding to a constant human craving to be-
lieve is old-fashioned; Erotic Faith-the book as well as the religion-is 
grounded in confidence in solitary genius, universal human need, and high 
culture. "Amen," his book concludes. "And ah women." Ah well, one adds, 
shaking one's head. 
Ruth Bernard Yeazell is the tonal antithesis to such Polhemusian self-in-
dulgence. Crisply and convincingly, she reads a half-dozen English novels 
she calls "fictions of modesty" -Pamela, Evelina, Fanny Hill, Mansfield Park, 
Villette, and Gaskell's Wives and Daughters-as reflections and productions of 
a culture in flux, where fictions were concocted in an effort to create defining 
boundaries. Mindful of Dr. Gregory as well as Rousseau, she tracks the lines 
writers drew, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, between nature and 
culture, and men and women, and bad women and good ones: her insights 
are strengthened by ideas derived from Mary Douglas and Erving Goffman. 
Yeazell argues that the modest woman and her characteristic trait, the blush, 
were invented and elaborated in order to deny female sexual desire-and 
that paradoxically, they also served to define it and enable its expression. 
Like Mary Poovey and Nancy Armstrong, Yeazell is interested in the in-
tersections of discourse, desire, and power. But she is more sanguine than 
they are about the truth value of fiction, and finds in the narratives that were 
wrought to serve the bourgeois power structure elements that help to decon-
struct it. First she analyzes how the fiction of modesty made the innocent 
young heroines of fiction implausible or worse: however virtuous, a first-
person narrator like Pamela or Evelina looks very like a hypocrite when mo-
desty prevents her from knowing her own mind, or recognizing the evils 
around her. Novelists reiterated the implicit message of conduct books, Yea-
zell shows, when they depicted modesty as a mixed sign-that a woman's 
mind and body are chaste, that she is promisingly "ardent." Advice manuals, 
she reminds us, were directed to women and also to men, who were encour-
aged to imagine-although "the physics involved remained rather vague"-
that "the coquette [was like] an open fire, whose warmth is widely available 
and rapidly expended, while the modest woman was more like a dependable 
stove, whose regulated surface temperature might promise a higher heat 
within." (47) The male or female novel reader who roots for the modest hero-
ine to win in love can be comfortably and respectably on the side of sex 
without quite knowing so-and will find it easy to read Fanny Hill as a hero-
ine because of her "virgin heart." 
Criticism, Vol. XXXIV, No.4: Book Reviews 623 
Showing how fictions of modesty were developed and altered by women 
novelists, and how they ultimately enable a subversion of the dominant ide-
ology, Yeazell does useful readings of even familiar fictional passages. Re-
lated to fictions of modesty, the dirtiness of Fanny Price's Portsmouth family 
home, and Jane Austen's unusually detailed description of the place, make a 
new kind of sense. The passage in Villette where Paul Emanuel reads Lucy's 
outer coldness as evidence of her inner passion is finely analyzed as evidence 
that Charlotte Bronte was "proto-Freudian." Yeazell's rewarding reading of 
Wives and Daughters as a revisionary fiction beautifully prepares for the short 
third and last part of this study, which briefly and brilliantly outlines how 
novels, themselves informed by the discourses of moralists and philosophers, 
informed "scientific" views of nature and sex. Not only his own Victorian 
modesty hut his well-known love of novels inclined Darwin to focus on 
courtship rather than mating among animals, she observes, and to character-
ize female animals as more discriminating and cooler than the parading 
males they choose from. Recent students of animal behavior have found it 
more useful to "write not about differences in the passion or ardor of the two 
sexes hut about different degrees of so-called parental investment," she in-
forms us; "an explanatory model based on reproduction has replaced the 
nineteenth-century model of desire" (226). 
Fictions of Modesty is especially valuable on the subject of the blush, which 
seems to have obsessed Havelock Ellis as much as it did Mr. Podsnap. Yea-
zel! begins her study with a look at "the English Freud," who rewrote as sci-
ence the English novel's implicit message that normal sexuality was primarily 
a delaying action, driven by the "preceding backwardness" (the appropriately 
tortured phrase is David Hume's!) that characterizes a modest woman facing 
sex. Having followed two centuries of specific and generic heroines whose 
blushes both belied and proved their modesty, the reader is pleasantly 
shocked by a phrase in Ellis (attributed by that writer to "an unknown 
source") that describes an erection as "a blushing of the penis." Sexual desire, 
Yeazell suggests, was "long-circuited" by the fiction of modesty-denied, 
projected, and displaced upward, she might have more banally said, were 
she not too fastidious, sophisticated, and clear-minded a critic to resort to 
such earnest attempts at "transparent" language. 
A project like Yeazell's raises problems of tone as Robert Polhemus's does 
not. Literary enthusiasm logically lends itself to praising works finely made 
in the service of eros and faith; the critic who undertakes to show how nov-
els are implicated in a tissue of lies may tend, on the other hand, to sound 
hostile to literature. Yeazell does not, because her own language is lucid, pre-
cise, and graceful, and because she obviously values the perverse linguistic 
structures she analyzes-paradoxes, oxymorons, plot-retardant fictions of 
modesty-for their subtleties and their absorbing complexities, which, she 
argues, are illuminating and finally even enabling. She does not argue for 
"her" novels' greatness as testimony to the human spirit; she argues that they 
are a significant and oddly coherent body of cultural work that demonstrates 
how important mystifications and fixed ideas about sex and gender have 
been in the development of middle-class identity as we continue to know it, 
and of the English novel in the dominant tradition we can classical, whose 
.J 
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patterns continue to inform pervasive attitudes and popular fiction today. 
Brooklyn College and The Graduate Center, CUNY Rachel M. Brownstein 
The Office of the Scarlet Letter by Sacvan Bercovitch. Baltimore: Johns Hop-
kins University Press, 1991. Pp. xxii, 175. $22.95. 
The Anatomy of National Fantasy: Hawthorne, Utopia, and Everyday Life by 
Lauren Berlaut. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. Pp. 269. $32.00 
(cloth); $14.95 (paper). 
A new book by Sacvan Bercovitch is certainly welcome by the many read-
ers of The Puritan Origins of the American Self (1975) and The American Jere-
miad (1978). Having proposed in these earlier works that the national ideal 
embodied in the representative American self is the product of the Puritan 
myth of a prophetic universal design, Bercovitch turns to Hawthorne and 
pursues his analysis of a Puritan hermeneutics that precludes choice in the 
name of consensus, thereby subsuming pluralism under a comprehensive na-
tional identity. This theory of consent has proved influential for new histori-
cists, including Lauren Berlant, whose study of Hawthorne and what she 
calls "national fantasy" intertwines literary history with post-structuralist 
theory. Both authors examine how American national identity is constituted 
but differ in their understanding of consensus formation. Nevertheless, they 
present similar interpretations of The Scarlet Letter, reading the disciplining of 
Hester as Hawthorne's own condemnation of radicalism in the name of lib-
eral individualism. 
Both authors argue that" America" embodies the utopian vision of a homo-
geneous national identity and that the "United States" signifies the reality of 
historical practices, but they differ in their interpretation of the relation of 
ideology to literature. For Bercovitch, the process of consensus diverts dissent 
into individual acts of rebellion, thereby defusing radical individualism by 
appropriating it for liberal ideology and its utopian consciousness. Berlant 
adapts Bercovitch's argument concerning the centrality of utopian discourse 
to American political practice and argues that The Scarlet Letter reproduces 
the dominant ideology but moves beyond representation to a critical relation 
to the forms of legitimation. Literature, in Berlant's view, shuttles between 
the public realm and the private, instructing its readers in national identity. 
This does not preclude Hawthorne's taking a critical attitude toward politics 
in America, but he does so only to embrace the utopian values that adjudi-
cate the private sphere. In other words, Hawthorne's critical position is that 
of the subaltern unable to free himself from the ideology of the dominant 
culture. Therefore, he is unable to conceive of "a positive construction of fe-
male political agency" (210). If this sounds censorious, it is so by virtue of its 
conception of literature as an instrument of ideology rather than as figural 
representation. For Berlant and other new historicists, not only does the cul-
tural text belong to the public realm and, consequently, ideology, but the 
work of criticism demands an oppositional reading of hegemonic ideology 
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that constructs an alternative interpretation of the world, especially by giving 
voice to the repressed groups present within the text. Hence, Hawthorne is 
admonished for his representation of women and Native Americans. 
To criticize Berlant for being ideologically driven in her reading misses the 
point of her argument, for it means assuming not only that the text is inde-
pendent of political culture but also that the critic can be free of ideology. We 
are not talking about subjective biases hut about ideology in the literary text. 
The question then remains whether the construction of a counter-hegemonic 
history is not itself yet another version of the American project of construct-
ing a national identity. In other words, her counter-hegemonic reading of 
National Fantasy constitutes a utopianism that is no less ideological for aban-
doning the national-utopian frame for citizenship for one that defines itself 
along material political practices. The failure to investigate ideology as narra-
tive results in the reproduction of ideology. The political or ideological is 
confined to the referential realm, hence the preference for a symbology of lit-
erary representation rather than a rhetorical reading of narrative. 
When we tum from Berlant's reading of the coercive force of the National 
Symbolic to Bercovitch's cultural symbology, we find that the political and 
historical are read as the horizon of all meaning into which any text may be 
translated. As he says, "My purpose ... is to integrate ideological and aes-
thetic criticism. Ideology in its narrow sense works to empty objects of histor-
ical content-particularly, in our time, objects of art. It depoliticizes them in 
order to refill them with its own timeless and universal claims" (xvii). This is 
by now a familiar argument in opposition to the so-called aestheticizing 
trends of new criticism and certain modes of structuralist and post-structur-
alist theory. Bercovitch uses "ideology" in a rather conventional sense to des-
ignate the system of ideas that serve as an instrument of social construction. 
It is opposed to history, which is taken to be the material practices that bind 
individuals in a collectivity. In this, he is very close to Berlant. The examina-
tion of "cultural symbology ... the system of symbolic meanings that encom-
passes text and context alike," suggests that the aesthetic will be attended to 
in proportion to the ideological; however, the aesthetic is once again an in-
strument of ideology. The text is political both as representation and as re-
flection of ideology. The scarlet letter is an instrument for political control 
and reflects the work of ideology, thereby allowing for the critique of its own 
office. 
This model is not without shortcomings, not least of which are its failure to 
question the meaning of the aesthetic, confusing it with formal design, and 
its inadequate treatment of allegory, reducing it to typology. Yet Bercovitch's 
study remains a useful one precisely because he attaches such importance to 
aesthetic technique and avoids the moralizing that mars a great deal of Ber-
lant's book. Perhaps the ideological difference between the two lies in Ber-
covitch's reading of The Scarlet Letter as "the liberal example par excellence of 
art as ideological mimesis" and Berlant's reading of its "nationalist literary 
project" as eliding Native American and women's histories (55). In her mor-
alistic zeal, Berlant misreads the text in order to reduce it to an example of art 
as ideological critique. That is, she reads The Scarlet Leifer as a critique of 
"'official' national identity" that fails to disengage itself from the patriarchical 
hegemony in which Hawthorne is a privileged participant. Therefore, jf Ber-
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covitch reads The Scarlet Letter as symptomatic of its historical context, Ber-
lant reads it as both reflecting and contesting American political practices. 
Berlant's approach is an object lesson in the confusion of history with con-
text. She fails to read ideology in the text because she divorces it from narra-
tive, prefering to repeat the banal condemnation of aestheticism as the desire 
to void art of history. 
Berlant's argument rests upon a structural analysis of the interlacing of the 
political, juridical, territorial, genetic, linguistic, and experiential "space of the 
nation" in the National Symbolic. She examines how national culture and 
identity pervade the local and private realms. Hawthorne's fiction simultane-
ously investigates the workings of the formation of the American national 
identity and resituates the official collective identity by recording or register-
ing the individual and community narratives that run counter to this official 
national identity. She claims that by historicizing "the rhetorical and practical 
processes by which nationality has been created, secured, and deployed," she 
can disclose the presence of "counter-hegemonic" communities that a na-
tional-utopian fantasy of Americanness attempts to control. The argument is 
framed in language derived from a mix of Michel Foucault, Jacques I.acan, 
Frantz Fanon, and others. Arguing that national culture works to transform 
the citizenry into a totality or makes the history of a nation a part of the indi-
vidual's experience, she investigates the "discursive practices" by which this 
national consciousness is put into practice. 
In "America, Post-Utopia," she analyzes the iconography of the Statue of 
Liberty as the "legible sex/text, the female body of the American National 
Symbolic" (27). That the statue serves to welcome immigrants reveals not 
only her function in nationalizing new arrivals but also the way "the body of 
the woman is employed symbolically to regulate or represent the field of na-
tional fantasy" (28). From the Statue as National Symbolic, she turns to Haw-
thorne's prefaces as an attempt to recreate his readers as national subjects. 
She is most convincing when she examines the mechanisms by which na-
tional symbols unite the individual, both as body and subjectivity, to the 
public sphere that constitutes official reality of the nation. 
Three chapters of the book are on The Scarlet Letter. She first considers 
"the mechanisms by which Puritan law intended to deploy the utopian prom-
ises of collective identity" (61) and then the way The Scarlet Letter "aims to 
tryout the mechanisms by which individual subjectivities get caught up in 
progressively more abstract collective identifications" (62). She concludes that 
in bearing Pearl and, therefore, the A, Hester "bears the law." To say that 
Hester is the site where civil, ecclessiastical and natural law intersect or that 
the A serves to suture body and mind is merely to tell us of the scarlet let-
ter's function to punish Hester by transforming her into an object lesson for 
the community, particularly the women. To charge that the letter transfigures 
the private citizen into a "juridico-utopian public sphere" is merely to tell us 
that the symbolic punishment serves its purpose, one noted by other readers 
attentive to Hester's role as public text. 
Having considered The Scarlet Letter as symptomatic, she then reads it as 
critical of national identity. She focuses on "counter-memory" and its corre-
sponding historical narratives that run alongside official memory and history 
as another "site of actuality and meaning." Counter-memory signifies the 
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preservation of a private sphere or subjective realm where the individual is 
not regulated by collective identity or national culture. The site for the strug-
gle between collective and individual identity is the body. Official history 
demands the regulation of the body, the subjugation of it to discipline, in or-
der to preserve national identity from the dangers that the gendered body 
represents to abstract citizenship. 
For Berlant, The Scarlet Letter depicts the disciplining of the body in the 
name of the national collective. The body must be disciplined because desire 
represents a threat to official history. The disciplining of women, above all, is 
necessary to preserve patriarchical privilege. Berlant's study participates in a 
larger scholarly effort to expose the repressive mechanisms of the formation 
of a national identity. The argument, however, raises a number of questions. 
Were she to attend to the text's allegorizing of the body, she would not be 
able to read it as symptomatic. 
If Berlant finds in Hawthorne a challenge to liberal ideology, Bercovitch 
finds in him the liberal ironist whose "ambiguities function as directives to 
narrative unity: they teach us to synchronize different layers of history by 
gathering a diversity of meanings within a single self-enclosed symbol. ... 
To see the past ironically is to affirm a design working itself out in such a 
way that, in Hawthorne's famous adage, 'Man's accidents are God's 
purposes'" (39). The ironist's perspective is not historical, for the past is com-
plete, a totality that reveals itself to God and the ironis!. Appropriately, he 
names this chapter "The Ironies of A-History," for this ironic perspective is 
ahistorical. The question remains, is it Hawthorne's? I would say not, for the 
past is anything but fixed in his works. As "The Custom-House" and such 
historically embedded tales as "Roger Malvin's Burial" and "My Kinsman, 
Major Molineaux" suggest, the past is subject to change under the eyes of the 
interpreter. The meliorist view of history attributed to Hawthorne reflects 
Bercovitch's reading of Puritan exegesis: "Hawthorne's Puritans are (as it 
were, despite themselves) a model of gradualist, multivocal interpretation" 
(47). As practioners of "pluralist interpretation," this "interpretative community 
[enjoyed] over modern liberalism ... a granite moral code on which to build 
forms of due process for a community committed to growth" (48). Bercov-
itch's Hawthorne is a new historicist reading the Puritans as a pragmatic peo-
ple whose settling of New England constituted "a commercial venture" that 
would lead to the liberalism of his own society. Where Berlant sees consen-
sus as repressive, Bercovitch sees it as accommodating individualism through 
sanctioned forms of dissent. 
Bercovitch's argument rests in large measure in his reading of allegory in 
The Scarlet Letter. The ambiguities that Hawthorne sets before us brings the 
reader into the communal activity of interpretation, which culminates in 
freeing the commentary from a self-binding truth to the acceptance of multi-
ple truths. This theme forms the basis for the first two chapters. There are, of 
course, numerous commentaries on allegory in The Scarlet Letter, and Bercov-
itch adds to them the dual perspective of reading it, on the one hand, in 
terms of Puritan exegetical practices and, on the other, in terms of contempo-
rary reader response theory and Stanley Fish's notion of interpretive commu-
nities. In his discussion of Hester's decision to resume the wearing of the let-
ter, he argues that the reader is enjoined to participate in the democratic pro-
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cess of interpretation. "Hawthorne so veils this epiphany that our multiple 
perspectives enact the same ideal of liberal community ... that his novel cel-
ebrates and represents" (92). 
In appropriating Fish's interpretive communities, Bercovitch provides the 
perfect critical model for consensus formation. Now the reader is disciplined 
along with Hester, forsaking the multiplicity of interpretation and the radical-
ism of an allegorical reading for the liberal ideal of an individuality absorbed 
into the community of readers. If Bercovitch can say "that the office of the A 
is socialization," which redirects radical energies "into a continuing opposi-
tion between self and society," then we might say that his repoliticizing of 
The Scarlet Letter redirects reading into an institutional form that circum-
scribes all opposition into a liberal model of consensus, a consensus that be-
gins with the understanding of interpretation as the entertaining of pluralities 
without choosing. If Berlant's study differs from Bercovitch's, it is in her uto-
pian hope the A can be discarded-that is, that the attachment to an abstract 
national identity can be overcome. Bercovitch, however, closes his book with 
the more sobering view that any such freeing of the individual from the coer-
cive power of ideology can only occur by the very agency of that same liberal 
ideology. 
Louisiana State University Joseph G. Kronick 
Ezra Pound as Literary Critic by K. K. Ruthven. Critics of the Twentieth Cen-
tury, Christopher Norris, Gen ed. London & New York: Routledge, 1991. Pp. 
208. $54.00. 
Ezra Pound and Italian Fascism by Tim Redman. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1991. Pp. x + 288. $34.50. 
In order to position these books, I offer some warnings and/or confes-
sional generalizations about reading Pound at the present time. It is too easy 
to come at Pound with our own desires at once to undo mastery and to mas-
terfully revise or redirect Pound's energetically iconoclastic and, if you will, 
genre/discipline-clastic impulses into instruments of or against modernism. 
His political incorrectness and personal peevishness seem the inevitable post-
modern corrective weaponry to deploy against their maker and, synecdo-
cally, against all bad fathers andlor phallogocentric criticism. Such a text or 
field must be approached with skepticism, if not irony, or not at all. Potential 
dangers, not to mention all Pound's self-justifying detractors, make me want 
to read him more carefully and, at the same time, to question my own meth-
ods and motives appropriated from what ends up being his anti-establish-
ment critical procedure. Despite himself, Pound's poetry and poetics shake 
notions of authorShip and authority as much as they fix these in statal or 
psychological F Ifascism. 
In the wake of recent "disclosures"-more correctly, less interested or sim-
ply different exclusions-regarding Pound's loudly proclaimed Fascist affilia-
tions and tendencies, it is now possible, even imperative to critically assess 
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the cultural and political writings of this embarrassing and largely censored 
modern poet, critic, radio propagandist, and jack of other trades. Just so, 
these two hooks employ recent re-editions of Pound's work and current ren-
derings of the de-canonized modernist's career. Indeed, Ezra Pound and Ital-
ian Fascism makes a valuable contribution as it recovers once quite public 
political statements from the scattered Poundian archive. 
K. K. Ruthven, whose gUidebook unfortunately moves to obviate the need 
to delve into Pound's own "guides" and "abc's," and Tim Redman, who 
traces the intimate details of Pound's flirtation with Fascism, are both en-
gaged in re-constructing the real [sic] or whole Pound(s). Ruthven too easily 
dismisses Pound's later work under the fashionable rubric "patriarchal criti-
cism," which he neatly, but without historical or political grounding, equates 
with Fascism. He re-works the lines by which modernism corrected its own 
extremists. Redman, by contrast, offers a resume of Pound's economic and 
political readings and writings directly linked to Mussolini's Italy. Sometimes 
too anxious to generously forgive his heroically engaged poet's errors, Red-
man manages to open that poet-critic's texts to further research and critique. 
He returns readers to (the case of) Ezra Pound. 
Both critics treat Pound's critical prose to the near exclusion of the poetry. 
Ruthven, tacitly accepting a diagnosis of the poet's systemic psycho-political 
illness, is most interested in Pound as a practicing and "practical" literary 
critic. His five short chapters are roughly chronological, yet they also map an 
oddly literal geographical and/or symptomatological determinism behind 
Pound's allegedly progressive literary and political marginalization and isola-
tion(ism). From Pound's apprenticeship at the University of Pennsylvania to 
his Italian and penal captivities, Ruthven economically remarks Pound's 
downward and eccentric trajectory in the adjectives of his chapter titles: 1) 
"The academic critic," 2) "The metropolitan critic," 3) "The practical critic," 4) 
"The rhetorical critic," 5) "The vanishing critic." 
Following the canonical-and now "decanonizing" -biographies, espe-
cially Humphrey Carpenter's A Serious Character: The Life of Ezra Pound, 
Ruthven traces Pound's fall from curious intellectual (both questioning and 
oddly posturing) to rigid authoritarian. He implies that changes of venue and 
media dictated Pound's entropic transformation from close to symptomatic 
reader, write~ of books to issuer of political salvoes, promoter of sophisticated 
modern art to socio-economic simpleton. Take for example, what Ruthven 
calls the "material conditions" of the poet-critic's residence in the British me-
tropolis: "when Pound left the academy and became a metropolitan critic he 
found himself among journalists and publishers who were severely con-
strained by deadlines and who took whatever shortcuts were available" (37; 
emphasis mine). Here one recognizes an updated version of Wyndham Lew-
is' epithet, "revolutionary simpleton," intended to point up Pound's misdi-
rected expansion from Imagist to political poet. 
One might ask, too: should the poet have remained safely and suburbanly 
"at home"? Further, are we to assume that reflection and academic reticence 
might have saved Pound from Fascism? If so, the apolitical or elitist aspect of 
New Criticism that Ruthven intends to correct by means of exploring the his-
torical Pound should instead be embraced. Of course, this is not what Ruth-
ven (thinks he) wants. Such an admission would endorse the dreary and po-
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litically suspect academic provincialism and subjectivism of formalist criticism 
-not to mention its dismissal of poetry's public/political aspect. Tim Red-
man is more (self-)conscious about the loss entailed in reading only the ac-
ceptable parts of the modernist canon, though part of his agenda is to make 
even Pound's errors prodigious, positively transgressive. Of the limited poet 
and poetry rescued by the Bollingen committee's expulsion of politics from 
the realm of poetry, Redman says: "[T]his retreat into subjectivity, this radical 
loss of bardic consequence, can be attributed to a large extent to the case of 
Ezra Pound .... the debate is not just about Pound but about the very nature 
and source of written authority" (13). 
Despite-or is it because of?-changes wrought by two world wars and 
more, in Ruthven's narrative, Pound's critical and personal moral character is 
a constant-in as much as inevitable and irreversible decline can be thought 
of as constant. Pound is a representative modern subject, a poet adventurer 
subjected to a history that Ruthven reads in the poet's style of criticism. 
Applying something of a double standard, Ruthven reads Pound's criticism 
"symptomatically"; just as Pound said he could determine the degree of 
usury in an age by looking at styles of painting, Ruthven can read Pound, the 
Fascism subject, in his progressively intemperate prose and loss of objectiv-
ity. It seems to me that focussing, however critically, on a critic's metonymic 
relation to the scene around him undercuts yet underwrites Ruthven's and, to 
a lesser degree, Redman's "deconstructive" [sic] assaults on the subject's (i.e. 
Pound's) phallogocentric work and turn of mind. 
Protests to the contrary notwithstanding, like many a Poundian, Ruthven 
cannot resist speaking in the master's metaphors or otherwise troping 
Pound's coinages and shibboleths. My favorite hybrid is "logofugal" for the 
style of Pound's pseudonymous music criticism, said to represent a poten-
tially critical and liberatory "drift away from logocentric use of language." 
Ruthven uncovers a nasty misogyny when Pound skirts and represses an ad-
umbration of the Lacanian Imaginary in his sexual/alluvial metaphorics; but 
rather than analyze the poet-critic, he becomes infected by these questionable 
figures: "as [Pound] floods his sentences with a mimetically rhythmic babble 
as yet undisturbed by these differentiations which ... constitute language" 
(116). Moreover, for Ruthven, whether Pound was browbeating a female lit-
tle magazine publisher, i.e. "Harriet Monroe who had the necessary masochis-
tic temperament for working editorially with Pound" (emphasis mine, 74) or 
"vandalizing an accepted name scatologically. . 'Bloomsbury' was 
'bloomsbuggery'" (136), Pound, the "phaHocrat" (78), realized his 
"profoundly authoritarian" (138) potential. Aware of, yet infected by, Pound's 
style of prose and/or thought, Ruthven goes so far as to caution us away 
from reading Pound's mature criticism symptomatically-even "closely." He 
says, "Guide to Kulchur is an amazingly open-ended production to have come 
from a writer usually thought of as at that stage unremittingly authoritarian. 
And, if nothing else, it points up the hazards of trying to educe political con-
clusions about writers from the evidence of their literary styles and forms" 
(139). 
It is not exactly that one wants to disagree with Ruthven's comforting dis-
missal of Pound's Fascist and cracker-barrel theories and affiliations, but his 
schematic summary often fails to engage the prose it criticizes and to critique 
i j 
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its own deployment of current argot. Ruthven's own stylized turns of phrase 
appeal to readers used to hearing literary critical tags cleverly employed, and 
he feels confident in gaining a consensus on his judgments about Pound. Fi-
nally, Ruthven is less ironic than self-righteous in his construction of an im-
proved, post-New Critical "our Pound" (emphasis mine, since I hear a 
Poundian "subject rhyme" with such ambiguous figures as Syberberg's "Our 
Hitler"). He concludes that this transitional figure or "discursive reproduction 
of 'our' Pound is a consequence of the conjuncture of two interpretive con-
ventions: the privileging of politicizing over aestheticizing reading practices, 
and the education of an authorial identity out of textual diversities" (170). 
The book's large price tag and schematic presentation (191 pages at $54) be-
speak the marketing strategy of Routledge's Twentieth Century Critics Series 
which accommodates economic and readerly scarcity. This is likely to be the 
one book about Pound's criticism that ever smaller library budgets can bear. 
Against its own claims to disrupt such authority and homogeneity ("criticism 
by anthologizing is profoundly authoritarian in its assumptions that the very 
act of selecting ... needs no justification," 138), it might be the master key-
or "master-plot"-the hurried student reads instead of Pound. 
This (re-)narrowing of Poundian modernism is especially distressing, given 
the almost madly rigorous "rhetoric" (as verbal persuasion) in Pound's heter-
ogeneous and heterodox personae in often weirdly self-defeating critical ar-
guments. Ruthven only begins (132-37) to risk an examination of the draw 
of Pound's prose style, where "Locutions from a variety of discursive do-
mains invade the space ... and are entertained there in a variety of moods, 
ranging from seriousness to mockery" (133). So convinced is Ruthven that a 
book like Guide to Kulchur incarnates fascism, that he retreats from his own 
rhetorical analysis by saying that it "is an amazingly open-ended production 
to have come from a writer usually thought of as by that stage unremittingly 
authoritarian .... it points up the hazards of trying to educe political conclu-
sions about writers from the evidence of their literary styles and forms" (139). 
Here Ruthven is on slippery ground; not accidentally, he is most interesting 
when his own contradictions expose the coincidence in Pound's work of au-
thoritarianism and the interrogation of personal and political identity. 
Pound's attempts to found and enforce a unified field of humanistic-eco-
nomic-political-aesthetic citational poetry (The Cantos) or a poetics of reading 
(ABC of Reading and Guide to Kulchur) can be read as a founding-or floun-
dering-gesture of cultural studies. If such a reading is to be politically cor-
rect, Pound is the Caliban who would have to be acknowledged by those 
Prosperos who recognize his lack of critical "purchase" at this time when crit-
ical correctness is achieved by (dis-)affiliation. But that would be a long and 
justly rejected Enlightenment and imperialist version of the Caliban-Prospero 
relationship. Pound might offer something of a cautionary tale about the re-
sults of fixing ethics in rhetorical" ethos" or self-fashioning. 
Ezra Pound and Italian Fascism provides a well-documented micro-history 
of Pound's abiding enthusiasms and commitments, from his desire to make 
criticism pay through a misinformed idealization of Salo's Confucian and/or 
"just and ordered" government and economy. It does less with the docu-
ments of Italian Fascism, and almost nothing with its translation onto the 
American scene, than one might want. Mussolini is seldom cited directly but 
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re-cited and redirected through Odon POT, the Hungarian economist and 
principal source for Pound's earliest understanding of Fascism. Since the in-
direction and/or misdirection of Pound's political engagements is the real 
topic of this book, the narrowed focus is logical. But Redman nearly repro-
duces the alleged isolation he refuses to attribute to Pound, while he illumi-
nates the filtering of Fascism and other political and economic doctrines 
through Pound's wishful thinking and "semantic sense" (167), that is, the 
poet's close reading technique of proving ideological affinity by impressionis-
tic etymological kinship. 
I would prefer a wider focus on Mussolini's and/or Fascism's improvisa-
tional and interpretative character, and away from the single author(itarian). 
Still, I appreciate Redman's attempts to escape the traps of demonizing a host 
of modern Western cultural evils in the person of Pound (like Robert Casillo 
in Genealogy of Demons) or gently excusing the idealist American naif (like 
Wendy Flory in The American Ezra Pound). Adopting a controversial thesis, 
only in part to renovate Pound, Redman argues that Italian Fascism can be 
viewed as a "marxist heresy" (3). Notwithstanding Mussolini's break with 
Gramscian Communism and his socialist syndicalist past, this makes only 
limited sense of a broad definition of left socialism. Yet, filtered through a 
hopeful populism, Fascism can be seen to address workers' interest and 
needs. And such is Redman's strongest and riskiest point about a certain an-
gIe on Il Duce: "[Pound] notes factors that compensated Italian workers for 
their loss of freedom. . Mussolini's socialist origins and sympathy for the 
workers, and the presence of a leftist branch of the Fascist party" (173). The 
last chapter, "The Republic of Salo and Left-Wing Fascism, usefuIly recovers 
the history of "the least documented of [Pound's] adult years" (233)-and 
one might add that 1943-45 were also the most contradictory and sparsely 
chronicled years of Mussolini's rule, riddled as they were with Nazi racism 
and neo-agrarian communalism. 
Redman presents a Pound out of touch with both American and Italian 
audiences. Steeped in Confucianism's retrograde ideals of order, cultural and 
intellectual hierarchies, Pound came to dream that the government that had 
underwritten his translation of Testamento di Confucio was enacting his pre-
ferred monetary reforms. Redman supports his claim that the most coherent, 
if deluded, statements of Pound's support for Mussolini appear in letters of 
1943-44 to Fernando Mezzasoma, the minister of Popular Culture, who sup-
ported Pound's scholarly and media efforts. These letters, the text and con-
text of Cantos LXXIl an LXXIII and of the pieces that appeared in serious ital-
ian magazines-all analyzed and/or quoted here at length-flesh out our too 
skeletal knowledge of Fascist mass media's workings and appeal. Redman's 
book is required reading for Poundians, not all of whom are apologists these 
days. 
Finally, it is usefully chastening to observe, in detail and from a semi-safe 
distance, the seductive pQ\.ver that fascist revolutionary and reformist propa-
ganda had for modern American "individuals." For Pound, ever the unfixed 
American or Emersonian self, fascism \vas just an improved sort of identity 
politics with the special appeal of Italy's cultural capital. Out of fragments of 
r..'1u550lini's speeches he fashioned or projected an idealized poet-hero and a 
bizarrely plausible cultural poetics. Pound's "'Mussolini and/or Jefferson" 
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[and/or Whitman and/or Pound] remains a complex to be reckoned with in 
the interested self-examination of literature and criticism as machines for 
producing and critiquing social and political constructions. Redman assists, 
while Ruthven allows the continued swerve away from, such a reckoning. 
Wayne State University Kathryne V. Lindberg 
Postmodernism and Its Critics by John McGowan. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1991. Pp. xii + 296. $39.95, cloth; $12.95, paper. 
Postmodem theorists derive notions of difference and heterogeneity from 
philosophical forefathers such as Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche. But their 
work, according to Postmodernism and Its Critics, devalues the positive unify-
ing principles that appear in the ideas these philosophers espouse. John 
McGowan sets out to recover what unites post-structuralism, Marxism, and 
neopragmatism, and concludes by suggesting that it is their commitment to 
democracy, as a unifying agent, which should draw postmodemists away 
from differences that criticize unity in order to privilege a unity that sanctions 
difference. 
Using Isaiah Berlin's distinction between positive and negative liberty, 
1.1cGowan presents a lucid and competent discussion of postmodernism's 
debt to this philosophical precursors. As the exploration of philosophers and 
theorists marches toward his "postliberal" manifesto in chapter 4, McGowan 
valorizes positive liberty and chides postmodernists for saying "both/and" 
instead of "either/or." Approaching the paradoxical relationship between 
positive and negative liberty in postmodern thought as a problem that can, or 
needs to, be solved, McGowan twists the premise that difference implies rela-
tional totality to suggest that this universality necessarily precedes difference, 
displacing negative liberty and privileging a grand Habermasian fiction of 
positive freedom. 
McGowan criticizes postmodernism for its persistent love/hate relationship 
with its own philosophical roots. In chapter 3, he examines poststructuralism 
(Derrida and Foucault), Marxism (jameson, Eagleton, and Said), and neoprag-
matism (Lyotard and Rorty) to resurrect a subtext of universality that, for 
many students of postmodern theory, was never dead or buried. Postmodern-
ism and Its Critics indicts postmodernism because it values difference and 
heterogeneity, which are linked to a desire for pure negative liberty-a free-
dom that postmodernists desire at the same time that they admit its impossi-
bility. Instead, McGowan wants postrnodemists to embrace-and be em-
braced by-positive power, and to resign themselves to certain "contextual 
constraints as the conditions of freedom" (86). That the postmodem critique 
is complicit in the system that it criticizes is old news. Linda Hutcheon's no-
tion of the complicit critique that postmodemism engages in as it attempts to 
de-naturalize culture from within (The Politics of Postmodernism, New York: 
Routledge, 1989) comes closer to a fair analysis of the relationship between 
positive and negative liberty in the postmodem world than McGowan's 
"postliberal" call for a positive power directed toward maintaining a social 
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consensus (270). McGowan's belief that he can simply "solve" this defining 
postmodern paradox of the complicit critique by privileging positive freedom 
is as fallacious as a vulgar postmodernisrn's idealistic desire for pure negative 
liberty. 
Postmodernism and Its Critics concludes by proposing a "politics of postli-
beralism," where democratic norms legitimate the procedures for critical ac-
tion under a holistic social theory. McGowan calls for postmodern intellectu-
als to surrender their desire for negative freedom entirely and to shift their 
energy towards "a practical politics of heterogeneity" (21). The politics he ad-
vocates are aligned with conservative forces attempting to smooth the ironic 
edge of postrnodernism's critique and to draw it into the complete complicity 
canonization and positive freedom imply. 
This book's main value lies in its reiteration of the philosophical underpin-
nings of postmodern critical theory, though, from beginning to end, the com-
plexity of a paradox that defines postmodernism gets slighted as the author 
charges towards his conclusion where postmodern intellectuals are positively 
subsumed by the "capitalist monolith." McGowan's representation of post-
modernism and his concluding section, "What's an Intellectual to Do?," are 
sure to provoke intense and interesting debate. However, he valorizes posi-
tive freedom at the expense of an effective examination of how specific theo-
rists juxtapose conflicting ideas about liberty, and the book suffers. Ulti-
mately, McGowan is frustrated trying to squeeze postmodernism into the 
frame of modernity. The issues reiterated in Postmodernism and Its Critics 
cannot even be competently addressed until we learn to speak of postmod-
ernism and postmodernity. 
Ball State University Trey Strecker 
